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The focus of the paper is upon the financial sector and, more specifically the 
involvement of global accountancy firms in devising and selling tax avoidance 
schemes euphemistically marketed as `tax planning’. Commenting upon some of the 
‘entrepreneurial’ activities of these firms, Perrow (2010) observes that ‘they knew 
what they were doing was fraudulent’ (ibid: 314) as he notes that Greenwood and 
Suddaby’s (2006) widely referenced study excludes consideration of how partners in 
these firms were complicit in embracing the `alternative logics pressed upon them by 
their large corporate clients” (ibid: 314). An example is  so-called ‘alternative logics’ 
is the construction and promotion of elaborate tax avoidance schemes by big 
accounting firms (Sikka and Hampton, 2005) which, we show, has become so deeply 








In a discussion of the financial crisis of 2007- and explanations of it, Perrow (2010) 
argues that “there is a danger that deliberate actions of executives will be attributed 
to institutional and cultural conditions” (ibid: 313). He acknowledges that `ideologies 
and norms motivate behaviours but challenges the view that actions such as 
lobbying for reduced regulation can be adequately explained as an expression of “a 
sincere belief that existing regulations interfere with a free market” (ibid: 314). 
Instead, he argues that such apparently sincere expressions of belief are often 
knowing (that is, cynical or self-serving) justifications of `institutional entrepreneurs’ 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006) who embrace ideologies to “promote their 
interests” (Perrow, 2010: 314). Such actors, Perrow contends, are not the `victims’ of 
market ideologies. Rather, he submits, they “have fostered and constructed these 
ideologies, or at least chose to embrace them, to serve their own interests, which 
include wealth, prestige, and the exercise of power over others” (ibid: 314). 
 
In this paper, our focus is the financial sector and, in common with Greenwood and 
Suddaby’s (2006) study, our attention is directed to the biggest global accountancy 
firms. Commenting upon some of the ‘entrepreneurial’ activities of these firms, 
Perrow (2010) observes that ‘they knew what they were doing was fraudulent’ (ibid: 
314). He also notes that Greenwood and Suddaby’s study excludes consideration of 
“the effort to establish such [“alternative logics”] which he associates with firms 
becoming more `“open” to the alternative logics pressed upon them by their large 
corporate clients” (ibid: 314). An example of the application of so called `alternative 
logics’ is the construction of elaborate tax avoidance schemes by big accounting 
firms (Sikka and Hampton, 2005), although, in this case, the creation and promotion 
of such schemes has become so deeply entrenched within the Big Firms as to 
normalize its `alternative’ status.   
 
A recent report ‘The Price of Offshore Revisited’ published by the Tax Justice 
Network (Henry, 2012) drew attention to $21 trillion (£13 trillion) hoarded by wealthy 
elites in secretive offshore jurisdictions to avoid taxes in their home countries. It 
explained that the offshore hoard is “protected by a highly-paid, industrious bevy of 
professional enablers in the private banking, legal, accounting, and investment 
industries … (our emphasis)” (Henry, 2012: 9). The recognition of this 
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`industriousness’ echoes Perrow’s (2010) insistence that `interests and power’, and 
not only `institutional and cultural traditions’ (ibid: 311), are involved. The pursuit of 
wealth, prestige and the exercise of power by concocting tax avoidance schemes 
have consequences for others, in the form of a lack of resources for expenditure on 
public goods to enhance or preserve hard won social rights. The General Secretary 
of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) makes the link between the missing tax 
revenues with the scale of deficits arising from the financial bubble and meltdown: 
 
 `Closing down the tax loopholes exploited by multinationals…to avoid paying 
their fair share will reduce the deficit. This way the government can focus on 
stimulating the economy, rather than squeezing the life out of it with cuts and 
tax rises for the 99% of people who aren’t rich enough to avoid paying their 
taxes’ (Stewart, 2012: 40).  
 
Where these loopholes are ineffectively closed or authorities lack the resources to 
challenge tax avoidance schemes, the burden falls upon those who cannot escape 
paying taxes, or it results in the erosion of public services often through backdoor 
privatization facilitated by the very accounting firms that confect tax avoidance 
schemes. Following the post-1970s rise of neoliberalism and the accompanying 
pressures to introduce light(er)-touch regulation, the state has been rolled-back and 
hollowed-out to fuel the growth of multinational corporations and accelerate the 
accumulation of private wealth. In this process, powers and resources lost to the 
state and people have been transferred to the private sector, including the big firms 
of accountants. Along with bankers and lawyers, the partners of the big accountancy 
firms have become new masters of the universe - a mastery that is manifest inter alia 
in their advisory activities with respect to tax avoidance as well as diverse forms of 
privatization (Sikka, 2008). 
 
As key players of the construction of post-1970s neo-liberalism, the Big Four 
accounting firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers. Deloitte and Touche, KPMG and Ernst 
& Young) have been major beneficiaries of financial expansion. They are all 
multinational and have devised ownership structures to frustrate scrutiny of their own 
affairs (Sikka, 2002), but play a central role in the construction and operation 
regulatory arrangements for corporations and global financial markets through 
governance arrangements, such as those relating to accounting and auditing 
(Arnold, 2009). As advisors to governments, the big accountancy firms are effectively 
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the standard setters who develop ways of maximizing corporate earnings and profit 
related executive rewards by selling creative tax avoidance schemes. Such schemes 
erode the revenues required for public investment, social interests and long term 
survival, and fail to develop a more accountable architecture of corporate 
governance (Humphrey, Loft and Woods, 2009). 
 
The Big Four accounting firms are central to the global tax avoidance trade which 
may have been responsible for the death of some 5.6 million children (Christian-Aid, 
2008). Employees and partners of the accounting firms do not directly kill people but 
they form part of a financial mafia that routinely participates in equally deadly 
activities by eroding public revenues which deprive people of jobs, healthcare, 
education, pensions, security and public goods or facilitate a race-to-the-bottom in 
which public services become degraded. Lord Haskel, a former chief executive of 
Perrotts Group plc, told the UK House of Lords that  
 
“There are armies of bankers, lawyers and accountants who ensure that even 
though the letter of the law is respected, increasingly immoral ways are found 
of perverting the spirit of the law to ensure that tax is avoided. To hide its true 
purpose, the tax avoidance industry adopts the language of real business, so 
technical innovation and reinventing your business model do not mean finding 
new products, services and markets, and new ways of supplying them. No, 
they mean registering your business in a tax haven and becoming a non dom 
to avoid tax while still enjoying the, admittedly decreasing, benefits and 
services which make this country the civilised place that it is1”.  
 
In the US, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has examined the 
development, marketing and implementation of abusive tax shelters marketed by the 
Big Four accountancy firms (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
2003, 2005) and found that they created a complex architecture of transactions to 
enable corporations and rich individuals to obtain tax benefits that were (probably) 
not directly intended by those responsible for passing the relevant legislation. In 
introducing a new Bill to combat organised tax avoidance the Subcommittee 
chairman Senator Carl Levin added that  
 
“many abusive tax shelters are not dreamed up by the taxpayers who use 
them. Instead, most are devised by tax professionals, such as accountants … 
who then sell the tax shelter to clients for a fee … we found a large number of 
tax advisors cooking up one complex scheme after another, packaging them 
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up as generic tax products with boiler-plate legal and tax opinion letters, and 
then undertaking elaborate marketing schemes to peddle these products to 
literally thousands of persons across the country. In return, these tax shelter 
promoters were getting hundreds of millions of dollars in fees, while diverting 
billions of dollars in tax revenues from the U.S. Treasury each year2”. 
 
The UK tax authorities have referred to Ernst & Young as "probably the most 
aggressive, creative, abusive provider" of avoidance schemes3 and courts have 
ruled that a PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) scheme was a “circular, self-cancelling 
scheme designed with no purpose other than to avoid tax4”. In the words of a former 
Commissioner of the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS): “Companies (and wealthy 
individuals) pay handsomely for tax professionals not just to find the lines, but to 
push them ever outward” (Everson, 2011). The Commissioner then adds that a low 
point came when the IRS discovered that a senior tax partner at KPMG had written 
to those in charge of tax practice and instructed them to “make a “business/strategic 
decision” to ignore a particular set of I.R.S. disclosure rules. The reasoning was that 
the I.R.S. was unlikely to discover the underlying transactions, and that even if it did, 
any penalties assessed could be absorbed as a cost of doing business”.  
 
As the financial and political clout of big accountancy firms has increased (see 
below), democracy, law and welfare with regard to their (ever-widening) spheres of 
activity have been compromised and weakened, not least as a consequence of the 
cosy and mutually advantageous relationships fostered between senior partners of 
the big firms, politicians and civil servants. We return to this ‘conspiracy’ of elites in 
the Discussion section. As a consequence of the neo-liberal economic experiment 
over which these elites have presided, there has been less of a promised trickle-
down of wealth to pull the most disadvantaged out of poverty than there has been a 
flood of untaxed wealth offshore. Living standards have been eroded and hard won 
social rights – pensions, education, healthcare - have being trimmed in part as a 
consequence of the tax avoidance schemes adopted by multinational corporations 
as well as wealthy elites.  
 
This paper consists of four further sections. In the first section, we take a closer look 
at the biggest, most global and influential of the accountancy firms. We then identify 
the impact of tax avoidance on state revenues and the role of the Big Four 
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accounting firms in eroding them. The second section provides brief examples of 
some of the tax avoidance schemes developed and marketed by these firms. In 
many cases the schemes are not devised in response to specific demands from 
clients, but are created to meet the demands of the neoliberal system in which 
private interests are routinely prioritized over wider social interests. The third section 
argues that the normalization of tax avoidance is deeply embedded within the 
business models of big accounting firms and is sheltered by a symbiotic relationship 
with political elites. In the fourth and final section, we return to Perrow’s thesis on the 
financial crisis and comment upon the relevance of our paper to understanding 
complexities of structure and agential responsibilities. 
 
2.0. Multinational Accounting Firms, Avaricious Clients and Lost Tax 
Revenues  
 
The state guaranteed monopoly of external auditing, in the UK and elsewhere, 
provides a springboard for the growth and influence of accounting firms. It gives 
them easy access to corporate clients and the sale of lucrative non-auditing services, 
including tax avoidance. Despite the banking crash and the ensuing economic 
recession, the annual revenues of the Big Four firms have continued to swell (Table 





ACCOUNTANCY FIRM INCOME AND SIZE – 2011/12 
Firm          Global  Employees  Countries Offices 
          Fees US$bn 
 
Deloitte & Touche  31.3.  193,000  153     670 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 29.2  169,000  158     771 
Ernst & Young  22.9  152,000  140     695 
KPMG   22.7  138,000  153     717 
BDO      5.6    38,922  135  1,082 
Grant Thornton    3.8    31,000  107     521 
 
Source: Annual reviews published by the firms 
 
The Big Four operate from hundreds countries and of cities, including over 80 offices 
in offshore tax havens5 which do not levy income/corporate taxes or require 
 8 
companies to file audited accounts. Around US$11bn (£7.36bn) of their global 
comes from the UK operations, which includes £4.6bn from consultancy services, 
including sale of tax avoidance schemes (Financial Reporting Council, 2012). The 
firms do not reveal the revenues generated through the sale of tax avoidance 
schemes, but a 2005 internal study6 by UK’s tax authority, Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC), concluded that the Big Four accounting firms generated 
around £1 billion in fees each year from "commercial tax planning" and "artificial 
avoidance schemes".   
 
The explosion of tax avoidance schemes finally led to an investigation by the US 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee and the resulting report highlighted the role of 
accounting firms (see Box 1). 
 
BOX 1 
The Tax Avoidance Business 
 
“The sale of potentially abusive and illegal tax shelters is a lucrative business … 
accounting firms ... have been major participants in the development, mass 
marketing, and implementation of generic tax products sold to multiple clients. … tax 
shelter industry was no longer focused primarily on providing individualized tax 
advice to persons who initiate contact with a tax advisor. Instead, the industry focus 
has expanded to developing a steady supply of generic “tax products” that can be 
aggressively marketed to multiple clients. In short, the tax shelter industry had 
moved from providing one-on-one tax advice in response to tax inquiries to also 
initiating, designing, and mass marketing tax shelter products ... dubious tax shelter 
sales were no longer the province of shady, fly-by-night companies with limited 
resources. They had become big business, assigned to talented professionals at the 
top of their fields and able to draw upon the vast resources and reputations of the 
country’s largest accounting firms …” 
 
Source: US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2005), The Role of 
Professional Firms in the US Tax Shelter Industry, Washington DC: USGPO, p. 6 
and 9. 
 
The Subcommittee received documentation (emails, memos, letters), subpoenaed 
witnesses and held public hearings to peer below the veneer of professional 
respectability and found an industry mired in dubious and even illegal practices. The 





Accountancy Firms and Tax Avoidance 
 
KPMG devoted substantial resources and maintained an extensive infrastructure to 
produce a continuing supply of generic tax products to sell to clients, using a process 
which pressured its tax professionals to generate new ideas, move them quickly 
through the development process, and approve, at times, illegal or potentially 
abusive tax shelters.  
 
Ernst & Young sold generic tax products to multiple clients despite evidence that 
some, such as CDS and COBRA7, were potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers sold generic tax products to multiple clients, despite 
evidence that some, such as FLIP, CDS, and BOSS, were potentially abusive or 
illegal tax shelters. 
 
Source: US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2005). The Role of 
Professional Firms in the US Tax Shelter Industry, Washington DC: USGPO, pp. 6-7 
 
The US legislators are concerned about the leakage of tax revenues as the amounts 
are large and could be used to support public services or pay off the deficit incurred 
by bailing out financial institutions. The official statistics focus on what is known as 
the “tax gap”, which is the difference between the amount that should be collected 
and the amounts actually collected. Tax gap primarily consists of tax arrears, tax 
avoidance and evasion. The estimates depend on models and various assumptions. 
The calculations are incomplete because little is known about the shadow or 
underground economy, which probably escapes various forms of taxes. The position 
is further complicated by the shifting of corporate profits to more favourable 
jurisdictions though transfer pricing practices (Sikka and Willmott, 2010). The US 
Treasury estimates the annual tax gap to be $345 billion8 though an alternative study 
puts the amounts at around $500 billion (Feige and Cebula, 2011). Some $100 
billion of this may be due to schemes operating through offshore jurisdictions (US 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2006, 2008). For 1998-2005, 
nearly 66% of the US domestic and 68% of foreign corporations did not pay any 
federal corporate taxes. In 2005, 28% of large foreign companies, generated gross 
revenues of $372 billion, but paid no federal corporate taxes (US Government 
Accountability Office, 2008).  
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The European Union (EU) has estimated the shadow economy to be “nearly one fifth 
of GDP on average across Member States, representing nearly €2 trillion [around 
£1.6 trillion, or US$2.5 trillion] in total” and favourably cites the estimate that “the 
level of tax evasion and avoidance in Europe to be around €1 trillion [£830 billion or 
US$1.25 trillion]” (European Commission, 2012). With a GDP of approximately €1.7 
trillion, the UK is the third largest economy (surpassed by Germany and France) in 
the EU, and the government admits to a tax gap of £40 billion (HMRC, 2010), later 
reduced to £35 billion (HMRC, 2011), and claims that 4% of it relates to tax 
avoidance (HMRC, 2012a). This compares to leaked government papers suggesting 
that the tax gap may be between £97 billion and £150 billion9, an economic model 
producing £100 billion (Lyssiotou, Pashardes and Stengos, 2004) and another report 
claimed it to be £120 billion (Murphy, 2010). Tax arrears, a component of the tax 
gap, cannot be relied upon to be collected. In 2011-12, the UK wrote-off nearly £5 
billion of tax liabilities, which included £1,989 of Value Added Tax (VAT), £635 
million in corporation taxes and £823 million of National Insurance Contributions 
(NIC) payable by employers (HMRC, 2012b). In his 2011 budget speech UK 
Chancellor George Osborne told parliament that “Some of the richest people in this 
country have been able to pay less tax than the people who clean for them”10. A UK 
government report showed that for the year 2005-2006, 220 of the 700 biggest 
companies paid no corporation tax and a further 210 companies paid less than £10 
million each and 12 of the UK's largest companies extinguished all liabilities in 2005-
2006 while scores more claimed tax losses (National Audit Office, (2007). The UK’s 
top 20 companies operate over 1,000 subsidiaries from secretive tax havens11, often 
formed with advice from accountancy firms to create opportunities to craft tax 
avoidance schemes. 
 
Developing countries, often some of the poorest, receive around $120 billion in 
foreign-aid12 from G20 countries, but they may be losing up to $1 trillion through illicit 
financial outflows each year, mainly to western countries (Kar and Cartwright-Smith, 
2008). Around $500 billion is estimated to be lost through a variety of tax avoidance 
schemes (Baker, 2005), of which some $365 billion is attributed to transfer pricing 
practices that shift profits from developing to developed countries (Christian-Aid, 
2009). An OECD official has estimated that Africa alone may be losing between 7% 
and 8% of its GDP, or $250 billion each year, through tax avoidance schemes13. 
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Such resources could be used to provide, sanitation, security, clean water, 
education, healthcare, pensions and social infrastructure to improve the quality of life 
for millions of people. 
 
Developing countries may lack the resources to combat the tax avoidance industry, 
but the UK appears to be soft-touch compared to the US where the Department of 
Justice has at least prosecuted and fined a number of accountancy firms and sent 
their partners to prison (see below), though its scale and severity has clearly been 
insufficient to curb their predatory ways of doing business. The firms simply treat the 
penalties as another cost of doing business. As public exposure of sleaze and 
scandals has increased, the UK government departments and regulators have 
shown little sign of emulating the US14. There has been no investigation of the tax 
avoidance industry, and no accountant or accountancy firm has been disciplined by 
any professional body for peddling tax avoidance, even after a court declared its 
schemes to be unlawful. The timidity of the UK institutions emboldened an 
accounting firm partner to declare15, “No matter what legislation is in place, the 
accountants and lawyers will find a way around it. Rules are rules, but rules are 
meant to be broken”.  The suggestion that “rules are meant to be broken” may have 
a popular resonance as it appeals to an individualistic antipathy towards collective 
responsibility. But its effects are plain enough in the recklessness driven by 
competition and venality that preceded the 2007- financial crisis, the social 
consequences of which are becoming clear though austerity programmes, 
unemployment and erosion of pensions, wages and welfare rights. However, as we 
will see, tax avoidance is accomplished not so much by breaking the letter of the 
rules as by deploying rules for purposes for which they were not (probably) intended.   
 
3.0 Big Four on the Make 
 
In this section, we focus upon the evidence of the extensive involvement of Big Four 
accountancy firms in crafting ingenious tax avoidance schemes. In doing so, we 
seek to underscore Perrow’s (2010) thesis that the development and use of tax 
avoidance schemes, like the financial innovations associated with the scale and 
depth of the financial crisis, comprise a significant agential component. The notion of 
`tax planning’ is an example of the `ideology’ to which Perrow refers when, 
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effectively, it is a euphemism for tax avoidance, if not tax evasion. As Perrow puts it, 
such ideologies serve to `mask or justify narrow interests’ (ibid: 326). In this case, it 
is the `narrow interests’ of the shareholders and executives of multinational 
corporations and wealthy individuals as well as the partners of the big accountancy 
firms that are advanced to the detriment of the 99% who rely upon public services 
paid for from taxation revenues. 
 
In the following subsections, we illustrate the diverse tax avoidance schemes 
operated by the Big Four. Our purpose here is to counteract the overwhelming 
number of studies of accounting and its big firms that primarily focus on auditing and 
accounting and pay little attention to their role in tax avoidance. Many of the studies 
are too easily seduced by claims of professional ethics and uncritically reflect exactly 
the impression that the firms seek to convey – of being upstanding and reputable 
servants of good corporate governance. Our exposition is primarily descriptive as we 
present a series of concrete examples in support of our contention that accounting 
firms are predatory and should be treated with contempt rather than respect. Only by 
providing such examples is it possible to challenge and debunk the conventional 
wisdom that these firms are honourable in their intentions and are staffed by 
upstanding individuals. 
 
3.1 Ernst &Young: Gold Bars, Trusts and Credit Cards 
 
Ernst & Young designed schemes to enable directors of Phones 4u (part of the 
Dextra Group of Companies) to avoid UK National Insurance Contributions (NIC) by 
paying themselves in gold bars, fine wine, and platinum sponge16. No sooner had 
legislation been passed to outlaw that scheme than Ernst & Young had devised 
another scheme. This enabled higher paid employees and directors of Phones 4U 
(and other companies) to avoid NIC and income taxes by securing payments through 
an offshore employee benefit trust (EBT) in Jersey. In such schemes companies 
paid money into the trusts which is then 'lent' to employees. As long as the 
transaction looks like a loan - for example, by carrying interest - then tax is avoided 
by the company and the employee.  
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The legal challenge revealed some interesting aspects. Firstly, it shed some light on 
networks of creative compliance. The court transcript noted that  
 
“Various schemes were investigated on the advice of Ernst & Young leading 
ultimately to the establishment … of the Caudwell Holdings Limited 
International Employee Trust (the EBT) by a deed between Caudwell 
Holdings Limited (as Settlor) and Regent Capital Trust Corporation Limited 
(Regent), a Jersey company (as Trustee)”.  Regent was owned by the 
partners of a Jersey law form, Bedell & Cristin. Ernst & Young’s trust company 
in Jersey, Ernst & Young Trust Company (Jersey) Limited (E&Y TC), could 
not act as trustee because Ernst & Young were the auditors of the Caudwell 
group. Regent was used only for Ernst & Young clients and there was an 
arrangement that in the event of the ownership of E&Y TC changing so that it 
was no longer owned by the auditing firm, or if the regulatory rules changed 
so that the audit relationship was no longer a bar, E&Y TC could acquire 
Regent. There was also an arrangement that E&Y TC … would do all 
administrative work in relation to trusts of which Regent was the trustee, 
leaving the decisions to Regent.” (para 1 and 2, Dextra Accessories Ltd & Ors 
v Inspector Of Taxes [2002] UKSC SPC00331). 
 
  Secondly, the firms knowingly are engaged in aggressive practices. The initial letter 
from Ernst & Young stated,  
 
"Obviously the aim of the arrangements is to provide income tax and NIC 
deferral for you three [this is a reference to directors] for bonuses which would 
otherwise be paid directly into your hands …. the implementation of tax 
planning points … will be viewed by the Inland Revenue as aggressive and 
therefore contain an element of risk".  
 
The scheme involved complex transactions and Ernst & Young subsequently 
advised the clients that "The ultimate success of the proposed arrangement depends 
upon the EBT having substance and commercial purpose”. This was taken to mean 
that other employees could be added to enhance the scheme’s legality, but 
subsequent records noted, "I stated that if John, Brian and Craig [all directors] were 
to participate in sub-trusts then it was necessary for other individuals to participate 
with sub-trusts as well on the same terms. There should be no deviation from this."  
The court’s interpretation of the documentation was that the directors were setting up 
a scheme for themselves and being advised that others should be included to make 
it look genuine. Some seven years after its design, the scheme was thrown out by 
the House of Lords judgment in HM Inspector of Taxes v Dextra Accessories Ltd 
[2005] UKHL 47 (07 July 2005).  
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Another of Ernst & Young’s avoidance schemes was designed to enable 
Debenhams and ninety major UK high street retailers to avoid paying Value Added 
Tax (VAT) collected from customers to the tax authorities and increase their profits 
(see Box 3). The key idea was to exploit exemptions built into the UK and European 




FIDDLING VALUE ADDED TAX 
 
“Until 1 October 2000 DR [Debenhams Retail], a 100% subsidiary of Debenhams 
Plc, used to sell goods whose price tag showed, for example, £100 ("the ticket 
price"). Where the customer used a credit card, a debit card or a store card to pay, 
DR  then paid the credit or debit card handling company, or the company behind the 
store card arrangements, an amount of, say, £1.00 for its exempt card-handling 
supply. The result was a supply by DR of the goods for £100; and because the 
amount paid by DR to the card-handling company (the £1.00) was in return for an 
exempt supply, no VAT relief was obtained for that expenditure. 
 
From 1 October 2000 onwards an arrangement was put in place. The arrangement 
was designed to change the terms on which "the Debenhams Group accepts credit 
cards in order to produce a position whereby less VAT is paid than was paid 
previously and for no other reason". Those words are taken from a letter dated 17 
March 2003 written by Ernst & Young (E&Y), the architects of the scheme who have 
represented Debenhams in the hearing before this Tribunal. The changed 
arrangements were designed to make the card-paying customer enter into two 
purported contracts at the point of sale. One was with DR for the sale of the goods 
(ticket price £100) for £97.50. The other was with another company called 
Debenhams Card Handling Services Ltd ("DCHS"). DCHS is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of DR, but is not a member of the same VAT group as DR. Under the 
latter purported contract 2.5% of the total ticket price was said to be payable to 
DCHS for exempt card-handling services. The arrangement, if successful, results in 
DR making a supply of the goods for a consideration of £97.50, i.e. 97.5% of the 
ticket price.” 
 
Source: Debenhams Retail PLC v Customs and Excise [2003] UKVAT V18169 (03 
June 2003).  
 
According to a letter cited by the tribunal, Ernst & Young explained that the 
arrangement was designed to change the terms on which "the Debenhams Group 
accepts credit cards in order to produce a position whereby less VAT is paid than 
was paid previously and for no other reason" (paragraph 5, Debenhams Retail PLC v 
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Customs and Excise [2003] UKVAT V18169). The outward sign of this scheme was 
a statement printed on customers’ credit card receipts. It read "I agree that 2.5% of 
the above value is payable to Debenhams Card Handling Services Ltd (DCHS) for 
card handling services. The total amount I pay remains the same." Of course, the 
price paid by the credit card customer was the same as for a cash sale. As financial 
services were exempt from VAT, Ernst &Young advised its clients to claim that 2.5% 
of the proceeds were not subject to VAT, and therefore the output tax payable to the 
Treasury would be less. In correspondence presented to the court, Ernst & Young 
referred to the £4 million VAT saving for Debenhams as “a very lucrative tax 
planning opportunity… an ongoing opportunity “unless legislated against by 
Customs" …counteracting measures would take "a number of years" to enact. …Due 
to the level of potential profit opportunity available there is a desire to introduce the 
scheme as quickly as possible". Ernst & Young informed Debenhams of a strong 
"counsels opinion that Customs would need a legislative change to stop this”. The 
tax tribunal concluded that the transactions in the scheme 
 
“were carried out solely for the purpose of avoiding tax. Other than tax 
avoidance there were no commercial or economic reasons … The 
arrangement was wholly artificial. The artificiality is driven home by the facts 
that the arrangements were administratively burdensome and a contingency 
plan was in place to "pull" them should they actually cause harm to DR's 
ordinary trading activities” (paragraph 117, Debenhams Retail PLC v Customs 
and Excise [2003] UKVAT V18169). 
 
The judgment also had implications for other retailers who bought the scheme and 
the matter went to the High Court (see Debenhams Retail Plc v Commissioners of 
Customs and Excise (2004) EWHC 1540 (Ch)), which ruled in Debenhams’ favour. 
HMRC then took the case to the Court of Appeal (Debenhams Retail Plc [2005] 
EWCA Civ 892) which outlawed the scheme, and the presiding judge referred to the 
scheme as “Tweedledum in Alice in Wonderland: I know what you're thinking about, 
but it isn't so, no how”. This scheme alone could have deprived the treasury of some 
£300 million to £500 million of tax revenues a year. A treasury spokesperson said, 
“This was one of the most blatantly abusive avoidance scams of recent years”17.  
 
Ernst & Young’s predatory practices have been scrutinised in the US (US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2005) and a number of,  what under 
these circumstances always become former, partners and employees have been 
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sent to prison18 for facilitating tax evasion. However, Ernst & Young have continued 
to design and market tax avoidance schemes as evidenced by cases such Wal-Mart 
Stores East v Reginald S. Hinton, Case No 06-CVS-3928, 31 December 2007, North 
Carolina Wake County, Superior Court Division and Prudential Plc v Revenue & 
Customs [2007] UKSPC SPC00636. 
 
3.2 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC): Beer, Propaganda and Losses out of 
Thin Air 
 
SABMiller is the world’s second largest beer company with brands that include 
Pilsner Urquell, Peroni Nastro Azzurro, Miller Genuine Draft, Grolsch, Aguila, Castle, 
Miller Lite and Tyskie amongst many others. Its accounts for the year to 31 March 
2011 showed sales revenues of US$19408 million (2010 $18,020million), pre-tax 
profits of US$3,626 million (2010 $2,929 million) and tax-paid US $885 million ($620 
million), which approximates an effective tax rate of 24% (2010 21%). Its 65 tax 
haven subsidiaries exceed the number of breweries and bottling plants in Africa. In 
2011, PwC received fees of $20 million, including $3 million for advice on taxation 
and another $5 million for “other services”. The company is audited by PwC which 
continues to give it a clean bill of health. 
 
Action-Aid (2010) alleged that SABMiller may be avoiding around £20 million in taxes 
each year in India and Africa through complex financial transactions, transfer pricing 
techniques and shuffling profits to subsidiaries in tax havens. The report noted that 
SABMiller’s brewery in Ghana, Accra Brewery, has sales of £29 million, but in the 
last two years declared a loss and has paid local corporation tax in only one of the 
four years from 2007-2010. The report showed that one woman selling beer outside 
SABMiller’s brewery in Ghana paid more income tax than the multi-million pound 
brewery. The Action-Aid report also showed that SABMiller companies in India and 
Africa paid some £47 million a year in management services fees to Swiss 
subsidiaries of the Group. These fees count as expenses for the Indian and African 
operations and deprive the local governments of some £9.5 million of tax revenues. 
SABMiller denied the allegations and claimed that 
 
“In the year ended 31 March 2010, the group reported US$2,929 million in 
pre-tax profit and group revenue of US$26,350 million. During the same 
period our total tax contribution remitted to governments, including corporate 
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tax, excise tax, VAT and employee taxes, was just under US$7,000 million. 
Seven times that paid to shareholders. This amount is split between 
developed countries (23%) and developing countries (77%). In both Colombia 
and South Africa, we contributed over US$1,000 million in taxation to each 
respective government's revenues.”19 
 
The blatant implausibility of SABMiller’s claim is noteworthy. The company had a 
profit of $2,929 million but made tax payments of $7,000 million! The tax payments 
are fantasy figures manufactured by PwC, all for a fee of course. They are an 
example of what PwC sells as a product called “Total Tax Contribution” (TTC)20. 
McIntyre (2006) observes that this calculation is to enable “corporations to pretend 
their tax bills are bigger than they really are, by counting not just their actual taxes, 
but also taxes they don’t pay, such as those paid by their customers, workers, 
suppliers, and so forth”. 
 
Corporations are eagerly embracing PwC’s TTC propaganda. In the US, ExxonMobil 
with profits of $36 billion claims to have paid taxes of $99 billion (McIntyre, 2006). In 
the UK, government reports show that major companies are avoiding taxes (National 
Audit Office, 2007); and others say that in 2009 only 33.6% of the UK companies 
actually paid corporate tax (Murphy, 2011). In contrast, a PwC report claimed that in 
2010 UK’s largest 100 companies made a total tax contribution of £56.8bn, which is 
11.9% of government receipts from all taxes (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). The 
PwC calculations include £39.2 billion which is not borne by companies. In fact, as 
income tax, VAT, NIC and fuel duty is remitted in arrears to government, companies 
are actually receiving a huge interest free loan from the taxpayer, even though they 
pass on the cost of acting as tax collectors to the consumer through prices. 
 
In a report prepared by PwC for the US Business Roundtable the impressive claim is 
made that major US corporations have an effective tax rate of 27.7% (US Business 
Roundtable, 2011). This figure has been scrutinised by Floyd Norris, a veteran 
journalist at New York Times, who put a number of questions to Andrew Lyon (a 
former assistant Treasury secretary under George W. Bush), the author of the PwC 
report. His questions included: “how much do these companies actually pay in taxes 
to Uncle Sam? How much do they actually pay to state and loan authorities? How 
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much do they actually pay to foreign governments? The commendably frank 
response was: “We have not looked at that data” (Norris, 2011). 
 
Floyd Norris notes that in the 1960s, corporate taxes amounted to about 22 percent 
of overall tax receipts. This figure averaged 3.9 percent of gross domestic product. In 
the most recent decade, the figures are about 12 percent of total taxes and 2.2 
percent of G.D.P. In other words, the corporate tax burden in roughly half what it 
was. In the US, corporate tax payments as a percentage of pre-tax income are lower 
than at any time since World War II. Of course, not all this reduction in tax paid by 
corporation is attributable to avoidance and evasion as they have been busy 
lobbying to shift their contribution to the pubic purse onto individual citizens. But PwC 
propaganda mimics the vocabulary of transparency whilst providing no information 
about its role in tax avoidance, the schemes that it manufactures, the amount of tax 
that major corporations should have paid, or even the fees that the firm charges for 
such spin and whitewash. Norris concludes that the PwC report was “blatantly 
misleading”. 
 
PwC is no stranger to controversy and spin. A 2005 report published by the US 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations concluded that the firm  
 
“sold general tax products to multiple clients, despite evidence that some, 
such as FLIP, CDS, and BOSS21, were abusive or potentially illegal tax 
shelters …Each of these tax products has been identified by the IRS as an 
abusive tax shelter. PwC’s handling of the FLIP tax product demonstrates the 
firm’s flawed process for developing, marketing, and implementing potentially 
abusive or illegal tax shelters. … PwC issued opinion letters to its clients, 
stating that it was “more likely than not” that FLIP would be upheld, if 
challenged by the IRS. PwC apparently continued to issue these favorable 
opinion letters even after learning that the FLIP transactions was the subject 
of federal legislation …” (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 2005: 7, 93, 96) 
 
The schemes were sold to wealthy clients through banks. One of the tax avoidance 
schemes known as Foreign Leveraged Investment Program (FLIP) migrated from 
KPMG to PwC after a KPMG partner joined the firm. Faced with possibility of 
retribution, the firm explained its predatory culture by stating that “In the 1990’s there 
was increasing pressure in the marketplace for firms to develop aggressive tax 
shelters that could be marketed to large numbers of taxpayers. This had not been a 
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traditional part of our tax practice, but regrettably our firm became involved in three 
types of these transactions. …” (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 2005: 94). At the Senate Subcommittee’s hearings 
PricewaterhouseCoopers personnel claimed that the firm has learnt from its past 
mistakes and has turned over a new leaf. It settled the cases with the US tax 
authorities by making a $10 million payment and handing over certain client lists to 
the IRS. It also permitted the IRS to review the firm’s quality control procedures and 
examine 130 schemes intended for sale to multiple clients. However, PwC has 
remained addicted to tax avoidance schemes. For example, in the US case of 
Enbridge Energy Co. and Enbridge Midcoast Energy LP v United States, 10 
November 2009, the presiding judge referred to a PwC designed scheme as  
 
“a sham conduit transaction … the transaction was designed solely for the 
purpose of avoiding taxes, and Midcoast has offered no adequate non-tax 
reasons for using a conduit entity … the uncontroverted evidence shows that 
the arrangement at issue in this case had the sole purpose of avoiding federal 
income tax.” (pages 9, 11 and 13 of the judgment). 
 
PwC’s alchemy is practiced in the UK too to enable clients to manufacture losses to 
avoid capital gains tax (CGT). In the case of Schofield v Revenue & Customs (Rev 
1) [2010] UKFTT 196 (TC), a taxpayer sold his business, making a profit of about 
£10 million. For a fee of £200,000, he bought a PwC tax avoidance scheme to create 
an artificial loss so that he wouldn't have to pay tax on the profit he made when he 
sold his business. The loss was created by using complex financial instruments 
(such as options, derivatives, gilts) in a series of circular transactions. The financial 
manoeuvres also involved Kleinwort Benson, a merchant bank. In selling the 
scheme, PwC told the client that: 
 
“The intention, as you know, is to create a capital loss of ₤11.8 million which 
can be set against the capital gain you have made on the redemption of your 
loan notes.  … although we believe this planning has an excellent chance of 
being successful, nothing can be guaranteed. … Our fees for this were 
agreed at 1 per cent of the loss i.e. ₤118,000 (the normal fee is 2 per cent for 
PWC and 2 per cent for Kleinwort Benson but you will recall that I agreed with 
them that as the gain would have been chargeable at only 14 per cent we 
would both discount our fees by one half). These are billable 50 per cent on 
implementation and 50 per cent when the loss is realised”. (para 16, Schofield 
v Revenue & Customs (Rev 1) [2010] UKFTT 196 (TC)).  
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The tax tribunal concluded that the loss claimed by the taxpayer was not allowable 
because there was no real loss. The case eventually went to the Court of Appeal and 
was declared unlawful because  
 
“Under the scheme as a whole, the options were created merely to be 
destroyed. They were self cancelling. Thus, for capital gains purposes, there 
was no asset and no disposal” (para 43, Schofield v HM Revenue and 
Customs [2012] EWCA Civ 927).  
 
The scheme was also sold to a number of other wealthy individuals and HMRC 
claimed22 that PwC’s defeat had saved the taxpayer at least £90 million, 
approximately equivalent to the cost of restoring eyesight for 90,000 cataract 
patients. 
 
3.3 Deloitte and Touche: Banks, Telecoms and Traders  
 
Deloitte & Touche (hereafter Deloitte) is caught up in tax avoidance by the Royal 
Bank of Scotland (RBS). The bank was bailed out by the UK taxpayer, but is 
accused of avoiding £500 million of taxes through complex avoidance schemes23. 
The schemes involved the movement of large amounts of cash, often through 
offshore places like the Cayman Islands.  In 2000, when Deloitte were first hired by 
RBS, the firm took £9 million in fees, including £4 million in consultancy fees. By 
2008, Deloitte were collecting £38.6 million in audit and £20.1 million for other fees. 
RBS received its customary clean bill of health from its auditors, and there is no 
mention of any tax avoidance scheme in its accounts. 
 
In 2004, Deloitte designed a scheme for the London office of Deutsche Bank (DB), 
advisors to the UK government on the sell-off of Northern Rock, to enable it to avoid 
income tax and National Insurance Contributions (NIC) on bonuses adding up to £92 
million. More than 300 bankers participated in the scheme which operated through a 
Cayman Islands-registered investment vehicle called Dark Blue Investment (DBI), 
managed by Investec. The key idea was summed up by a Tax Tribunal: 
 
“DB arranged for certain bonus sums that were to be payable to identified 
individual DB employees to be paid into the vehicle created for the Scheme 
and not directly to any employee. Those sums were used to purchase shares 
in DBI which were allocated to individual employees. DB employees were 
given rights to sell their shares and withdraw sums from the Scheme over a 
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period, up to the amount of the individual bonus of the employee subject to 
any fluctuation in the value of the shares during the period. If this right was 
used the employee received a cash sum. The Scheme was wound up at the 
end of a specified period, and sums paid to employees who had not 
previously received sums from the Scheme” (para 9, Deutsche Bank Group 
Services (UK) Ltd v Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 66 (TC)) 
 
Deutsche Bank argued that the employees received nothing taxable when the sums 
were paid into the Scheme. They received shares, but no income tax or NIC 
contribution liability arose in respect of the receipt of those shares as they were 
“restricted securities” exempted from liability by section 425 of the Income Tax 
(Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (ITEPA). Employees disposed of their shares by 
sale at various times, but there was no income tax liability or NIC contribution liability 
by reason of the sale. 
 
The Tribunal judge concluded that the avoidance scheme was put together by 
Deloitte on the basis of a more general proposal initially presented to Deutsche 
Bank. Deloitte continued throughout to play a central role in designing and delivering 
the Scheme. The firm developed a draft timetable and action plan for the Scheme. 
An email assured clients that  
 
“each time an action changes in time, delay or advancement, Deloitte will 
review the whole process to ensure any knock-on effects are dealt with 
effectively. The timetable will be published to all involved every 2/3 days, 
including an early Monday morning edition focussing on action for the week in 
strict order” (para 23, Deutsche Bank Group Services (UK) Ltd v Revenue & 
Customs [2011] UKFTT 66 (TC)) 
 
The Tribunal rejected the scheme24, the assessment of the judge being that “the 
Scheme as a whole, and each aspect of it, was created and coordinated purely for 
tax avoidance purposes” (para 112, Deutsche Bank Group Services (UK) Ltd v 
Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 66 (TC)) 
  
In another Deloitte tax avoiding scheme, the firm was embroiled in the acquisition of 
the German telecoms operator Mannesman by London-based Vodafone, the world’s 
largest mobile telecommunications company. The acquisition was financed by a 
€35bn debt parked in Vodafone’s Luxembourg subsidiary, VIL Sarl. Under the deal 
Mannesmann paid interest on debt to VIL Sarl and thereby reduced its taxable profits 
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and tax bill in Germany. The interest received by VIL Sarl avoided tax. These 
transactions fell foul of the UK Controlled Foreign Companies legislation as the tax 
authorities argued that the financing deal was "wholly artificial”. Some estimated that 
the UK authorities calculated that a staggering £6 billion of tax was unpaid by 
Vodafone, although the details have never been made public. Vodafone’s accounts 
audited by Deloitte contained a provision of £2.2 billion to meet the expected tax 
liability. Coincidentally, Deloitte showered hospitality upon HMRC boss Dave 
Hartnett25. According to Private Eye (21 June 2011), since 2006 Dave Hartnett had 
no less than 48 meetings with Deloitte UK chairman David Cruickshank. As if by 
magic, Vodafone’s tax liability shrank. The £2.2bn provision suggests that the 
company was preparing to settle for £2.2 billion, but the actual settlement was a 
lump sum of £800,000 and a further £450,000 spread over five years. 
 
The commodity trader Glencore International has subsidiaries in Bermuda, 
Luxembourg, Jersey and the British Virgin Islands, and in May 2011 was floated on 
the London stock market. The flotation fees of some US$435 million were shared by 
various underwriters, bankers, lawyers and accountants. Deloitte and Touche 
provided accountancy services for an unspecified sum. For the year to 31 December 
2010, Glencore reported sales revenues of US$145 billion and pre-tax profits of 
US$4,340 million. The total worldwide tax-paid was just US$323 million, an effective 
rate of 7.44%. The company does not say how much tax it paid to each country. 
Deloitte audited the Group’s accounts for the year to 31 December 2010 and gave 
them a clean bill of health. However, Glencore’s stock market debut was marred by 
allegations of tax avoidance by the Zambian government. These were based upon a 
report26, prepared by Grant Thornton, another accountancy firm, that had been 
commissioned by the government in which Glencore’s trading relationship with its 
Zambian subsidiary Mopani Copper Mines Plc was examined. The report alleges 
that an accounting technique (transfer pricing) enabled the company to shift profits 
from Zambia. More specifically, it alleges that Mopani may be selling Zambia’ copper 
to Glencore at less than the prevailing market prices so as to reduce the profits 
booked in Zambia and thereby deny the government about £100 million in tax 
revenue. Glencore denies the allegations27 and as part of its defence produced a 
statement from Deloitte, Mopani’s auditors, which claimed that Grant Thornton’s 
report was flawed28. The Zambian government has asked the OECD to intervene.  
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3.4 KPMG – General Electric, Royalty Programmes and Offshore Fictions  
 
In March 2011, General Electric (GE), the largest corporation in the US, hit the 
headlines for its tax avoidance strategies. It also has operations in the UK. The 
company reported worldwide profits of US$14.2 billion, including US$5.1 billion from 
its operations in the US. Its US corporate tax bill was zero. The company used a 
series of complex transactions and accounting gimmicks to make its tax liability 
disappear29. The auditors could have highlighted the unusual transactions to 
reassure stakeholders, especially as in 2009 GE paid US$50 million penalty to settle 
accounting charges by SEC30. KPMG has been auditing GE since 1909 and for 2009 
and 2010 it received $219 million in fees, including $17 million for advice on tax. GE 
received a clean bill of health from KPMG. 
 
KPMG is no stranger to negative public exposure. It received considerable exposure 
from the collapse of WorldCom, a giant US communications corporation. For a fee of 
US$9.2 million KPMG advised WorldCom to increase its profits by adopting an 
intangible asset transfer pricing program. Under this, the company created the asset 
“management foresight”, a previously unknown intangible asset. Management 
foresight is little more than providing various bundles of services. The asset was 
registered to a subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction, which in turn licensed it to other 
companies in the group for annual royalty payments. The paying subsidiaries treated 
royalty charges as an expense that qualified for tax relief, whilst the income in the 
hands of the receiving company attracted tax at a low rate. In effect, no cash went 
outside the corporate group, but this transfer pricing arrangement may have saved 
the company between US$100 million and US$350 million in taxes. WorldCom’s 
insolvency examiner (United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York, 
2004) found that in some cases the royalty charges exceeded the company’s 
consolidated net income in each of the years 1998-2001. In other cases, they 
represented 80 to 90 percent of a subsidiary’s net income. Over a four year period 
covering 1998-2001, more than US$20 billion was accrued in royalty fees for use of 
the company’s intangible assets and most of the fees resulted from the licensing of 
“management foresight”.  
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Another KPMG scheme (see RAL (Channel Islands) Ltd v Customs and Excise 
[2002] UKVAT V17914) used an offshore fiction to attack VAT revenues in the UK. 
The normal position is that traders charge VAT to customers and collect what is 
known as “output” tax. Thus a sale of £100 is accompanied by VAT at the current 
rate of 20% and the trader collects £100 plus VAT of £20, i.e. a total of £120 from the 
customer. The trader incurs VAT on its eligible purchases. This is known as “input” 
tax. If the trader bought the item for say £40, and the VAT rate was 20%, then s/he 
would incur “input” tax of £8 and pay a sum of £48 to its supplier. Periodically, 
traders pay the difference between “input” and “output” to the tax authorities. For the 
above example, the trader would be required to pay £12 (£20 - £8) to the tax 
authorities. An accountancy firm could concoct a scheme under which the trader is 
somehow no longer liable to account for “output” tax. In which case, the trader would 
not collect output tax on sales to be paid to the tax authorities, though s/he might still 
sell the product for £120. In addition, if the trader is registered for VAT then s/he is 
also entitled to a refund of the input tax (£8 above) from the tax authorities. The 
upshot is that the trader’s profits improve dramatically. This was the basic logic of a 
VAT avoidance scheme marketed by KPMG. 
 
The scheme was not developed in response to any request from the company. 
KPMG cold-called on the company. Its presentations were subject to a confidentiality 
undertaking being given. The visual presentations referred to the scheme as 
"KPMG's VAT Mitigation Proposals for Gaming and Amusement Machines”. Under 
the scheme gaming machines in 127 amusement arcades in the UK were leased to 
a newly formed Channel Islands subsidiary company, which was granted licences by 
a group company in the UK to use the arcades. Another UK subsidiary contracted 
with the Channel Islands company to provide the staff at the arcades. The basis of 
the scheme was that the place of supply of gaming machine services to customers 
would be in Guernsey and that the Channel Islands company would be entitled to 
repayment of input tax on supplies made to it without being liable to any output tax. 
Such a view was based on an interpretation of the European’ Union’s Thirteenth VAT 
Directive which enables businesses not established in the EU to recover VAT on 
business expenditure incurred in member states.  
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Before the KPMG scheme, a single UK subsidiary made the supplies and output tax 
was paid. RAL owned or leased the arcades and employed staff. Output tax was 
paid to the tax authorities. Following the introduction of the KPMG scheme there was 
no change of the business. Slot machines remained where they were, but their 
ownership was now assigned to a Channel Islands company. KPMG listed over 80 
steps that the company had to undertake to make the scheme work. These included 
attention to control of companies and appointment of skeletal staff in the Channel 
Islands to satisfy the letter of the law about control and ownership of companies. 
KPMG predicted that the avoidance scheme would boost RAL’s annual profits by 
£4.2 million. KPMG would charge £75,000 plus VAT for an evaluation report and 
counsel's opinion and a fee of 25 per cent of the first year's VAT savings, 15 per cent 
of the second and 5 per cent of the next three year's savings. KPMG anticipated that 
the UK tax authorities would regard the scheme as 'unacceptable tax avoidance' and 
would challenge the arrangements, but still commended its purchase. It sought to 
reassure clients by stating that 
 
“… a similar concept for telecommunications ran for nearly four years in most 
Member States of the EU before the UK, French and German Governments 
secured the unanimous agreement of all 15 Member States to amend the 
primary legislation and stop the concept. Since at the moment we are not 
aware of any widespread use of these planning arrangements, and the fact 
(sic) that some EU Member States do not charge VAT on gaming machine 
income, unanimous agreement to amend the EC legislation could be difficult 
to achieve.  … It should be possible to unwind the arrangements if the idea is 
subsequently blocked or successfully challenged by Customs” (para 22, RAL 
(Channel Islands) Ltd v Customs and Excise [2002] UKVAT V17914). 
 
The UK authorities challenged the scheme and a tax tribunal decided that there was 
no real change to the substance of the business and that the Channel Islands 
company, trading in the UK was liable to output tax on the Gaming Supplies and 
consequently liable to register for VAT. It determined that RAL was not entitled to 
VAT refunds. The case was then taken to the High Court and eventually the 
European Court of Justice (RAL (Channel Islands) EA (Taxation) [2005] EUECJ C-
452/03), which stated that the economic activity took place in the UK – the contract 
arose at the moment at which the customer placed a coin in the slot machine. The 
slot machines were physically in the UK and therefore the contracts were performed 
entirely within the UK, and so the scheme was assessed to be unlawful.  
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Only rarely do authorities examine tax avoidance as a central, institutionalized 
element of the `business model’ of big accounting firms, rather than targeting its 
grossest or most readily curtailable manifestations. In 2002, the US Justice 
Department filed a suit compelling KPMG firm to disclose information about tax 
avoidance schemes marketed by the firm since 1998. KPMG grudgingly complied, 
but withheld a substantial number of documents. This lack of co-operation 
persuaded the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations to examine 
KPMG more closely and to open up its organisational culture. To this end, the 
Senate Committee scrutinised (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 2003) four (only) of the firm’s five hundred “active tax products”. 
Three of the schemes manufactured paper losses to enable clients to reduce their 
income tax. The fourth used a “charitable contribution strategy” to reduce the tax bills 
of companies. KPMG received around $124 million in fees for these schemes. 
 
The most significant finding of the Senate investigation was that KPMG had an 
extensive organisational structure for developing and marketing tax avoidance 
schemes. Notably, it had a “Tax Innovation Center”, with income generating targets 
whose sole function was to hatch new schemes. Staff were incentivised to submit 
ideas for new schemes. In addition, the firm had a market research department, a 
Sales Opportunity Centre that worked on “marketing strategies” and telemarketing 
centre staffed with people trained to make cold calls and find buyers. Staff were 
coached in sales patter. Thousands of corporations and individuals were contacted 
to sell the products. Enormous pressure was put on those working in the firm’s tax 
unit to sell avoidance schemes and meet revenue generating targets. Staff were 
encouraged to make misleading statements to potential buyers, such as claiming 
that a scheme was no longer available for sale, even though it was, apparently 
hoping that reverse psychology would persuade the client to buy the product. In 
folklore, accountancy firms claim that they operate “Chinese Walls” that somehow 
avoid conflicts of interest – for example by separating the consultancy and audit 
arms. But KPMG tax professionals were directed to contact existing clients about the 
product, including KPMG’s own audit clients. Sceptical buyers were told that the 
schemes had been examined by leading law firms and that they could buy insurance 
to protect themselves. They were also given soothing opinions by friendly lawyers 
working with KPMG and in many case the firm itself drafted the lawyers’ letters. 
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Fearing a regulatory backlash and also the possible loss of competitive advantage, 
KPMG presentations to potential clients were made on chalkboards and erasable 
whiteboards. Written materials were retrieved from clients before the salesman left 
meetings. Potential clients had to sign “non-disclosure” agreements. Staff were 
instructed to delete revealing documentation from their files in order to limit detection 
of the firm’s activities. Major banks, including Deutsche Bank, HVB, UBS, and 
NatWest provided loans for millions of dollars essential to the orchestrated 
transactions. KPMG did not disclose the existence of any of its 500 schemes to the 
IRS. Senior personnel were aware of its legal obligations but chose to flout them. 
Extracts from internal correspondence (see Appendix 1) provide an indication of the 
firm’s business culture. On one occasion, a KPMG tax specialist voiced concern that 
the tax authorities would object to an avoidance scheme. In response, a senior 
partner who was becoming concerned about the delay in marketing the product 
wrote to tax partners and told them “I do believe the time has come to shit and get off 
the pot” (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2005: 20). The 
senior partner was aware of the risks of litigation but was focused on the fees and 
adds that "My own recommendation is that we should be paid a lot of money here for 
our opinion since the transaction is clearly one that the IRS would view as falling 
squarely within the tax shelter orbit."  The deputy head of the tax practice responded 
by saying “I think it’s shit OR get off the pot. I vote for shit.” (ibid: 21) 
 
The Senate Committee investigation was followed by criminal charges and on 29 
August 2005, the US Department of Justice announced31: 
 
“KPMG LLP (KPMG) has admitted to criminal wrongdoing and agreed to pay 
$456 million in fines, restitution, and penalties as part of an agreement to 
defer prosecution of the firm … nine individuals-including six former KPMG 
partners and the former deputy chairman of the firm-are being criminally 
prosecuted in relation to the multi-billion dollar criminal tax fraud conspiracy.” 
 
The statement continues: 
 
“In the largest criminal tax case ever filed, KPMG has admitted that it engaged 
in a fraud that generated at least $11 billion dollars in phony tax losses … cost 
the United States at least $2.5 billion dollars in evaded taxes.… KPMG also 
admitted that its personnel took specific deliberate steps to conceal the 
existence of the shelters from the IRS by, among other things, failing to 
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register the shelters with the IRS as required by law; fraudulently concealing 
the shelter losses and income on tax returns; and attempting to hide the 
shelters using sham attorney-client privilege claims… the opinion letters 
issued for the FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS and SOS shelters were false and fraudulent 
in numerous respects …”32 
 
KPMG’ predatory culture came under the spotlight because of determined action by 
US Senators and regulators. The same culture operates in the UK too, but only 
comes to light when occasionally, after years of expensive litigation, the schemes 
are struck down by the courts. It is impossible to determine how much remains 
undetected. The fines and related imprisonment of some personnel did not curb 
predatory practices. KPMG continues to peddle tax avoidance schemes, as 
evidenced by the cases of J Astall & Anor v Revenue & Customs Rev 1 [2007] 
UKSPC SPC00628, Drummond v HM Revenue & Customs [2009] EWCA Civ 608 
and Reed Employment Plc & Ors v Revenue & Customs [2012] UKFTT 28 (TC). 
 
4.0 Discussion: Institutionalized Corruption 
 
The previous section offered brief glimpses of the predatory practices of accounting 
firms. Behind a disarming wall of prestige and secrecy, they operate factories 
devoted to manufacturing schemes to enable wealthy clients and multinational 
corporations to avoid direct and indirect taxes. No social value is created, but the 
firms make millions on fees. As a consequence, citizens are required to forego hard 
won social rights or to pay disproportionately higher taxes. Lost tax revenues result 
in increased government borrowing and debts. 
 
The big accounting firms camouflage their practices with ethical codes and glossy 
corporate social responsibility reports. Their claim is to be advising clients on ‘tax 
planning’ – a euphemism for tax avoidance and evasion. Schemes of the kind 
illustrated in the previous section masquerade as forms of ‘tax avoidance’ that are 
deemed to be legitimate until they are challenged and found to be unlawful. Such 
schemes invariably involve complex transactions that have little or no other purpose 
or justification than contriving to escape the payment of tax. If the political will and 
adequate resources were made available to expose the spuriousness of so much 
`tax planning’, it may be possible to estimate how many other similar schemes would 
be found unlawful33. When the schemes are left unchallenged, the firms rake in fees 
as the public purse is robbed. When thwarted, the response is to invent more 
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ingenious schemes, leaving taxpayers to pick up the substantial legal and 
administrative costs of challenging their legality.  
 
We have shown how accounting firms are at the centre of a huge tax avoidance 
industry. But it is salutary to appreciate that these firms form an integral part of a 
network of banks, law firms and other professionals. To return to ‘The Price of 
Offshore Revisited’ study mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Henry (2012) notes 
how tax avoidance through the use of tax havens and other schemes is  
 
`a  very  lucrative  global  industry…This industry has basically been designed 
and operated  for decades,  not by shady  no name  banks  located  in  island  
paradises,  but  by  the  world’s largest private banks,  as  well  as  leading  
law  firms  and  accounting  firms.  All of these institutions are based, not in 
island paradises, but in major First World capitals like New York, London, 
Geneva, Frankfurt, and Singapore’ (ibid: 43).   
  
In accountancy firms, tax departments function as profit centres and are assigned 
revenue generating targets. Their `tax planning’ schemes are not only manufactured 
in response to `large corporate clients’ who `press’ such demands upon them, as 
Perrow (2010: 312 ) assumes. Firms also produce off-the-shelf schemes which are 
mass marketed. Staff are trained in sales talk and encouraged to be persistent. 
Where activities are known to be vulnerable to challenge, firms take a business risk 
as they know that tax authorities lack the financial and administrative resources to 
pursue more than a small number of schemes. In some cases, firms have calculated 
that they stand to make more money from illegal activities, even after paying 
financial penalties.  
 
Individuals who are found to fiddle their taxes but lack the resources to hire 
scheming accountants and lawyers face the wrath of the tax authorities. In contrast, 
large corporations34 and accountancy firms do deals. In the US, KPMG admitted 
“criminal wrongdoing” but the firm was able to deploy its political and financial 
resources to negotiate a fine of $456 million as a means of its survival.  In 2004, the 
UK Chancellor called in senior partners from Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and Young, 
KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers to warn them35 that the Government was 
concerned about the “rising scale, seriousness and aggression” of tax avoidance 
 30 
marketing. He told them that it was wrong for firms to market loopholes when they 
knew that the Revenue would close them down as soon as they could. Such appeals 
clearly fell upon deaf ears, which is hardly surprising when successive UK 
governments have neither sought to recover the legal and administrative costs of 
fighting the firms nor investigated their predatory practices. In good times, when 
economic growth and debt financing ensured an expansion of public services, 
citizens and regulators seemed prepared to turn a blind eye. But citizens are now 
showing their anger with the financial sector and with the tax avoidance industry 
more specifically. Notably, the direct action group UKUncut has taken to the streets 
to draw attention the damage done to the social fabric by the financial sector, 
including the big accountancy firms36.  
 
Nonetheless,  such is the hold of the big accountancy firms on the officials of the 
state, for reasons that we explore briefly below, that these firms continue to act as 
advisers to government department and receive government contracts, all paid by 
the taxpayers. Their dominance exerts a corrosive effect upon the state’s capacity to 
challenge and discipline their activities. How has this state of affairs come to pass? 
In the UK (and possibly elsewhere too), one significant development has been the 
closeness of relations between politicians, civil servants and the Big Four firms. For 
example, before the 2010 general election, the Big Four firms gave £3.5 million to 
the Conservative Party and provided advisers and consultants to shape party 
policies. Coincidentally, the firms stand to gain a £100 million a year windfall as the 
incoming coalition government has abolished the Audit Commission and passed the 
local authority audit work to accountancy firms. The Big Four firms are not, however, 
`party political’ as they have also lubricated the Labour Party in previous elections, 
notably when the polls have suggested a high probability of victory. 
 
Institutionalized cosiness-cum-corruption – made embarrassingly visible by the 
revelations of the Leveson inquiry37 which has exposed the chummy relationship 
between successive administrations and the media, especially the Murdock empire – 
is evident in accountancy industry’s `wining and dining’ of Britain's top civil 
servants38. Here, again, there is evidence of actors – including the partners of the 
Big Four firms – purposefully courting politicians and civil servants (and vice-versa). 
Most active in this sphere is KPMG closely followed by PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
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Deloitte and Ernst & Young. It is doubtful that the dinners set up by these firms were 
to discuss how their predatory practices might be curbed. Rather their function is to 
lubricate firms’ colonisation and hollowing out of the state and to hedge against 
unwelcome forms of state oversight or intrusion into their business practices. The 
dividends associated with such investments are high. In 2007, soon after KPMG 
admitted “criminal wrongdoing” for tax dodging and paid the highest fine ever levied 
by the US government (see above), the UK government did not investigate the firm. 
Instead it bestowed a knighthood upon KPMG International chairman (2002 to 2007), 
Michael Rake, for services to the accountancy profession. In October 2010, Sir 
Michael Rake became an advisor to Prime Minister David Cameron. Nick Gibb MP, a 
former KPMG staffer, has held senior positions in the Conservative Party and in 
2010 he became the Minister of State for Schools. In June 2012, KPMG UK 
chairman John Griffith-Jones was appointed non-executive chair of the UK’s new 
banking regulator the Financial Conduct Authority. In July 2012, Ian Barlow, a former 
KPMG senior partner, a tax specialist and a member of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) became the Lead Non-Executive Director 
and chair of at HMRC Board. This cosiness with the state is not new. Just over a 
decade earlier, in 1999, KPMG chairman Colin Sharman was elevated to the House 
of Lords by Liberal Democrats. Another KPMG partner and former ICAEW President, 
Sheila Masters, became a life peer in 2000 and Conservative Party’s Treasury 
spokesperson. 
 
The above examples are not isolated. Former PricewaterhouseCoopers staffer Mark 
Hoban is the current UK Treasury Minister responsible for oversight of tax laws. In 
May 2010, another PwC alumnus Justine Greening became Economic Secretary to 
the Treasury, followed (October 2011) by Secretary of State for Transport and then 
(September 2012) Secretary of State for International Development. The Private 
Finance Initiative is a huge money spinner for accountancy firms. A PwC partner, 
Richard Abadie, has been the head of PFI policy at the UK Treasury and has been 
accompanied by 10 or more colleagues39. In June 2009, former PwC partner Amyas 
Morse was appointed UK Comptroller and Auditor General and became responsible 
for directing the National Audit Office (NAO). There he is accompanied by another 
former PwC partner, Dame Mary Keegan, who previously was chairperson of the UK 
Accounting Standards Board and subsequently an adviser to the UK Treasury. In 
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2008, PwC tax partner John Whiting, an architect of the “Total Tax Contribution” (see 
above) was awarded an OBE for public service. In June 2011, he became the 
Director of the newly established Office of Tax Simplification (OTS), advising the 
government on simplification of tax laws40.  
 
A further instance of the closeness of relations between the big firms of accountants 
and key departments of state is the appointment of Chris Tailby, one time tax partner 
at PricewaterhouseCoopers, as Head (until 2009) of Anti-Avoidance at HMRC. In 
September 2004, Sir Nicholas Montagu, the former chairman of the Inland Revenue 
(now HMRC) became an advisor to PricewaterhouseCoopers. In July 2010, partners 
from KPMG, Ernst & Young, Grant Thornton and BDO became members of the 
government appointed Tax Professionals Forum41 which shapes the UK tax law - a 
classic case of foxes guarding the henhouse. Following disquiet about the loss of 
personal data of UK taxpayers, the Prime Minister turned, in 2007, to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers partner Kieran Poynter (who earns £3m per year)  to write 
a report. In January 2008, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown was accompanied on 
his visit to China by Ernst & Young chief Mark Otty, KPMG chairman John Griffith 
Jones, Deloitte senior partner John Connolly42 (who earns £5.1 m per year). For the 
five years to 2010, the National Health Service paid out £487 million to external 
advisers and consultants, paying £1,000 a day to personnel from 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte. Then in July 2009 former 
Labour Health Minister Lord Norman Warner of Brockley became a strategic adviser 
to Deloitte’s public sector practice. 
 
There are numerous other examples. Prior to the 1997 general election, Sir Stuart 
Bell MP was Labour’s spokesperson on trade and industry where he became a 
strong advocate of liability concessions for auditing firms. After the general election 
victory, he failed to secure a cabinet position and soon became an adviser to Ernst & 
Young. Former Labour Business Secretary Lord Peter Mandelson resigned from 
government in 1998, but was soon hired by Ernst & Young. He subsequently 
returned for two more stints as Business Secretary and Labour quietly dropped its 
1997 business manifesto commitment to have independent regulation of the world of 
accountancy. Since 1999, former Conservative Minister Sir Malcolm Rifkind has 
been an adviser to PricewaterhouseCoopers. In June 2011, former Labour Home 
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Secretary Jacqui Smith became a consultant for KPMG, the firm that advised Libyan 
dictator Colonel Qaddafi on managing his wealth43. In an earlier incarnation as a 
trade minister, Ms Smith piloted auditor liability ‘cap’ through parliament, all without 
demanding any quid pro quo from accountancy firms. No doubt, all these politicians 
are eager to serve the public interest, but their conception of ‘public interest’ is also 
probably influenced by their wealth and their business interests. 
 
We have provided some detail of the links between the big accounting firms, 
politicians and civil servants in order to substantiate claims that are otherwise airily 
dismissed as `fanciful’ and `conspiratorial’, or are explained away as functionally 
necessary for government that is `in touch’ with business (and vice-versa).  We have 
focused upon normal, institutionalized corruption within the UK but, of course, the big 
accounting firms are multinationals and they have colonised international structures. 
They hire lobbyists for the EU and are present in force at the OECD and other 
meetings. Knowing where their fees come from, they frustrate development of 
accounting standards that can expose corporate tax avoidance. An example of this is 
their collective resistance to a proposal to adopt a country-by-country approach to 
financial accounting as this would force corporations to publish information showing 
their assets, liabilities, profits, losses, sales, costs, staff, etc. in each country. The 
effect would be to show how, for example, companies have a huge trade in the UK 
but pay virtually no corporate taxes. Unsurprisingly, the Big Four firms are opposed 
to this proposal, as is the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) - a 
private London based limited company that issues international accounting 
standards dealing with disclosures by corporations. It is the Big Four firms that fund 
the IASB and their personnel dominate its proceedings. The IASB does not ask 
companies to publish anything about profit shifting through transfer pricing and other 
accounting practices.  
 
The Big Four also effectively control the formulation of auditing standards at home 
through the Financial Reporting Council and globally through the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC). Despite thousands of pages of auditing 
standards, not one line is devoted to accounting firm accountability, responsibility or 
even asking firms to come clean about how they help companies to dodge taxes. 
Despite losses of billions of pounds of tax revenues, the UK government has failed to 
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investigate the tax avoidance industry, or prosecute any of its key players. The anti-
social practices of accountancy firms are routinely camouflaged by claims to 
professionalism, ethical conduct and technical competence that apparently disarm 
journalists, legislators and critics. Disarmament is occasioned by giving priority to the 
development of impression management gimmicks. For example, in April 2011 
PricewaterhouseCoopers appointed its first head of reputation44 which is perhaps 
best likened to presiding over the Ministry of Love in George Orwell’s 1984. 
 
Much consultancy practice is, of course, dedicated to enabling clients to dodge 
health and safety, food hygiene, building, immigration, transport or other laws. But 
there is only one organised industry devoted to tax avoidance. Accountancy firms 
employ and train thousands of people for the sole purpose of minimizing tax 
revenues by creating ingenious forms of `tax planning’, thereby undermining elected 
governments and depriving millions of people of much needed healthcare, 
education, pensions, security and other essentials. Occasionally, schemes marketed 
by these firms as found be ‘unacceptable’ by being tested in the courts. But UK 
governments have not followed up such malpractice by prosecuting the firms or 
closing them down. Instead, partners of these firms are courted by politicians and 
civil servants and receive public contracts as well as honours in recognition of their 




We have shown how `tax planning’, often a euphemism for tax avoidance and 
evasion schemes, is not the preserve of a single firm but, rather, is institutionalized in 
all of the Big Four firms. The active promotion of schemes that have no other 
justification than to escape payment of taxes, and thereby deprive the 99% of 
revenues required to maintain public services such as education, health and 
pensions, casts doubt upon the `business culture’ that has become established in 
these firms. These firms have developed tax avoidance for corporate and private 
clients on an industrial scale that act to shift taxes  away from giant corporations and 
wealthy elites to labour, consumption and savings, depressing ordinary people’s 
purchasing power and contributing to economic and social crises.  
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In the financial sector, and in the Big Four accountancy firms in particular, the 
devising of tax avoidance schemes demonstrates how self-interest and shady 
practices have become normalized. The commercial priority of making money has 
seemingly triumphed over any concern about social welfare and obligations to 
citizens.  The big firms have repeatedly demonstrated a preparedness to do almost 
anything to swell their revenue streams and thereby increase personal rewards. 
Partners in these firms are the promoters and beneficiaries of a business culture in 
which ‘bending the rules’ to make profits at almost any cost is considered to be a 
`competitive necessity’, and celebrated as a manifestation of exceptional 
entrepreneurial skill that, of course, justifies the payment of a correspondingly 
exceptional fees and salaries running into multiple millions. Employees of major firms 
are inculcated into prioritising the commercial interests of the firm as a means of 
enriching its partners, and staff are left in no doubt that their employment and career 
progression depends on delivering this commitment, or at least managing the 
impression of this delivery. What, in the early 1990s might have been received as the 
unguarded bragging of senior partner who openly declared, “a firm like ours is a 
commercial organization and the bottom line is that … the individual must contribute 
to the profitability of the business … essentially profitability is based upon the ability 
to serve existing clients well” (Hanlon, 1994: 121) has become, normalised as `how 
business is’, as if partners have no responsibility for contributing to the development 
of this state of affairs..  
 
A definition of a rotten business culture is arguably one in which the “emphasis is 
very firmly on being commercial...rather than on being public spirited on behalf of 
either the public or the state” (Hanlon, 1994: 150). In this respect, and as Perrow 
(2010) stresses, there is a danger that `deliberate actions of executives’ [e.g. who 
prioritize `commercial’ over `public’ concerns] `will be attributed to institutional and 
cultural traditions’. We have sought to counteract this emphasis by showing how 
partners of accounting firms have actively and shamelessly promoted tax avoidance, 
often portrayed as `tax planning’, as a lucrative segment of their business that has 
enabled them to amass huge personal fortunes. We have noted that demands for 
such schemes were not always `pressed upon them by their large corporate clients’ 
(Perrow, 2010: 312) as they were initiated by departments within the firms dedicated 
to developing schemes that could be mass marketed to their clients. That said, we 
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take issue with Perrow when he counterposes ‘agential’ against `structural’ 
explanation of practice, such as the practice(s) comprising the diverse tax avoidance 
schemes.  
 
Here we return to the broad theoretical issues raised in the introduction to the paper. 
In our view, so-called ‘agency’ is formed through `structure’ in ways that are 
irreducible to it. With regard to the tax avoidance schemes explored in the paper, we 
suggest that their development is plausibly understood as the production of agents 
whose `interests’ are largely constructed within the structural media of neo-liberal 
business practice. This interpretation acknowledges the `embeddedness’ of agency 
but it also attends to how agency is formed through an engagement with structures 
that pre-exist its emergence and actions. In effect, the context of neo-liberalism 
presents opportunities for partners to exercise their agency in developing or 
overseeing `tax planning’ schemes. 
 
When preparing schemes of tax avoidance, agents (e.g. Big Firm partners and 
specialists charged with the devising the schemes) operate in a structural milieu 
where neo-liberal thinking has become institutionalized as common sense. As 
Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) note in their study of the Big Five accountancy 
firms (as they were prior to the demise of Arthur Andersen), the existence of an 
`established (e.g. neo-liberal) `logic’ does not rule out the possibility of agents, as 
`institutional entrepreneurs’, developing and commending `alternative logics’. 
However, and as Perrow (2010) himself concedes, the articulation of such logics is 
often excluded or suppressed through the exercise of power. Taking the example of 
the Challenger `accident’, Perrow notes how managers were eager to launch as they 
were under pressure from the White House following previous delays. They over-
ruled the engineers who knew that the O-rings were vulnerable in exceptionally low 
temperatures. This over-ruling, we contend, can be interpreted less as an expression 
of individual or occupational agency per se than as an articulation of a complex web 
of power relations that, as Perrow notes, stretched to the White House To pin the 
blame on agents, as Perrow invites us to do, is to risk overlooking the wider complex 
of power relations in which self-serving actions are promoted and normalized..  
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In conclusion, and to return to our opening gambit, a limitation of the agency-
structure dualism, in which analysis flip-flops from a structural to an agential 
orientation, is its disregard of the relational quality of institutionalization processes. 
When this relational quality is appreciated, reducing agency to the conditioning of 
structure is implausible, as Perrow (2010) persuasively insists. But it is also 
important to avoid attributing forms of resistance to a seemingly unconditioned 
agency that, for example, is able to make a wilful `choice to embrace’ the ideology of 
`tax planning’ in order `to serve their own interests’ (ibid: 312, emphasis added) - as 
if the identification of these interests is self-evident, or is accomplished 
independently of participation in the prevailing practices and associated belief 
systems. In order to challenge and remove the practices of tax avoidance that have 
no other justification than the escape of tax payments and the resultant degradation  
of public welfare and amenities, it is important to insist upon agential responsibility 
for devising, promoting and operating such schemes. It is also necessary to 
recognise that the removal of such schemes depends upon making the connection 
between their appeal to their architects and purchasers, and participation in the 
institutions of neo-liberal capitalism that fosters and normalizes this appeal.    
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APPENDIX 1 
KPMG BUSINESS CULTURE 
First, the financial exposure to the Firm is minimal. Based upon our analysis of 
the applicable penalty sections, we conclude that the penalties would be no greater 
than $14,000 per $100,000 in KPMG fees. ... For example, our average deal would 
result in KPMG fees of $360,000 with a maximum penalty exposure of only $31,000. 
This further assumes that KPMG would bear 100 percent of the penalty. In fact ... the 
penalty is joint and several with respect to anyone involved in the product who was 
required to register. Given that … our share of the penalties could be viewed as 
being only one-half of the amounts noted above. If other OPIS participants … were 
also found to be promoters subject to the registration requirements, KPMG’s 
exposure would be further minimized. Finally, any ultimate exposure to the penalties 
are abatable if it can be shown that we had reasonable cause. .. To my knowledge, 
the Firm has never registered a product under section 6111 .... 
Third, the tax community at large continues to avoid registration of all 
products. Based upon my knowledge, … there are no tax products marketed to 
individuals by our competitors which are registered. This includes income conversion 
strategies, loss generation techniques, and other related strategies. 
Should KPMG decide to begin to register its tax products, I believe that it will position 
us with a severe competitive disadvantage in light of industry norms to such degree 
that we will not be able to compete in the tax advantaged products market. 
Fourth, there has been (and, apparently, continues to be) a lack of enthusiasm 
on the part of the Service to enforce section 6111. In speaking with KPMG 
individuals who were at the Service ... the Service has apparently purposefully 
ignored enforcement efforts related to section 6111. In informal discussions with 
individuals currently at the Service, … confirmed that there are not many registration 
applications submitted and they do not have the resources to dedicate to this area. 
Finally, the guidance from Congress, the Treasury, and the Service is minimal, 
unclear, and extremely difficult to interpret when attempting to apply it to ‘tax 
planning products. ... 
I believe the rewards of a successful marketing of the OPIS product ... far exceed the 
financial exposure to penalties that may arise”. 
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